

















Charles Darwin and the scientific mind
David Stack*
Abstract
Although often presented as an essential, ahistorical, or innate psychological entity, the 
notion of a ‘scientific mind’ is ripe for historical analysis.  The growing historical 
interest in the self-fashioning of masculine identities, and more particularly the self-
fashioning of the nineteenth century scientist, has opened up a space in which to probe 
what was understood by someone being said to possess a ‘scientific mind’. This task is 
made all the more urgent by the recently revived interest of some psychologists in the 
concept and the highly gendered and culturally conditioned understanding of the 
scientific mind displayed in some contemporary debates. This article contributes to that 
task, and fills a rare gap in Darwin studies, by making the first detailed exploration of 
Charles Darwin’s understanding of the scientific mind, as revealed in the psychological 
self-analysis he undertook in his ‘Recollections of the development of my mind and 
character’ (1876), and supplemented in his Life of Erasmus Darwin (1879). Drawing 
upon a broad range of Darwin’s published and unpublished works, this article argues 
that Darwin’s understanding of the scientific mind was rooted in his earliest notebooks, 
and was far more central to his thought than is usually acknowledged. The article 
further delineates the differences between Darwin’s understanding and that of his half-
cousin Francis Galton; situates his understanding in relation his reading of William 
Whewell and Auguste Comte; and considers what Darwin’s view of the scientific mind 
tells us about his perspective on questions of religion and gender.  Throughout, the 
article seeks to show that the ‘scientific mind’ is always an agglomeration of historically 
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specific prejudices and presumptions, and concludes that this study of Darwin points to 
the need for a similarly historical approach to the question of the scientific mind today. 
It is quite common, in reading and in conversation, to find references to the ‘scientific mind’, 
but it is difficult to ascertain precisely how this mental structure is supposed to differ from 
other sorts of mind.  (J. W. N. Sullivan, ‘The Scientific Mind’, 1925)
The hesitancy of the science writer and journalist J.W.N. Sullivan (1886-1937) in defining the 
‘peculiar kind of mind called the scientific mind’ was rooted in his discomfort with the role 
scientists had played in the First World War. The conflict, Sullivan argued, had shredded a 
‘common article of the Victorian scientist’s creed’: the notion that the scientific mind was 
necessarily moral or noble. This intimation of what Steven Shapin has called the ‘moral 
equivalence’ of scientists and non-scientists combined for Sullivan with the ways in which he 
saw national characteristics inflecting scientific research, and led him to an implicit 
understanding of the scientific mind as a culturally conditioned construct, shaped by political 
events.1 This contextual awareness stands in contrast to the more straightforward ‘traditional 
description of the scientific mind’ expressed by another journalist who, writing 30 years earlier 
described it as ‘calm, judicial, unemotional, [and] semi-sceptical towards all things until 
actually proved’.2 The contrast of late-Victorian certainty with interwar angst is hardly 
surprising, but it helps to highlight what ought to be an obvious point: the ‘scientific mind’ is 
not an essential, ahistorical, or innate psychological entity, but is a culturally sensitive 
construct, ripe for historical analysis. 
The term was certainly in use at the start of the nineteenth century.3 That flawed but beguiling 
research tool the Google ngram viewer suggests a rapid growth in usage from the early 1860s, 
peaking in 1875, the year after the publication of Francis Galton’s English Men of Science, 
followed by a slight dip, a period of uneven growth, a sharp rise up until an absolute peak in 
1929, and a slower decline down to the year 2000.4 This pattern is probably much as we would 
expect from long-view commentaries on the reputation of science and scientists, such as that of 
Shapin, but clearly much more qualitative work is needed to establish both how usage of the 
term changed over time and how the ‘scientific mind’ aligned with, or can be distinguished 
from, other categories, such as ‘men of science’, ‘scientific worker’ or, perhaps more 
pertinently, ‘philosopher’ and ‘genius’. The histories of these terms have already begun to be 
written and the stated objective of Joyce Chaplin and Darrin McMahon’s work on genius, to 
treat ‘genius as a historical concept, rather than a presumed transhistorical fact’, offers an 
important example of how a history of the ‘scientific mind’ might be approached.  ‘Genius’ and 
the ‘scientific mind’, however, were not synonymous. Chaplin and McMahon chart the rise of 
‘genius’ as a general or universal quality against an earlier tradition in which ‘one might 
possess a particular genius, or be ingenious in a particular field’.5 The growing nineteenth 
century use of the term ‘scientific mind’, with its implied exclusivity to a discrete specialism, 
suggests that this rise did not go unchallenged.  
Perhaps one reason why historians have so rarely engaged directly with the term is its sheer 
slipperiness. As Sullivan noted, although used frequently, the term ‘scientific mind’ has rarely 
been defined explicitly, and even among psychologists has consistently failed to gain traction as 
an independent area of study. Gaston Bachelard’s La formation de l’esprit scientifique (1938) 
encouraged the exploration of psychological factors in the development of the sciences, but it 
was not until 1966 that the phrase ‘psychology of science’ first appeared in an English language 
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book title – Abraham H. Maslow’s Psychology of Science – and another forty before G. J. 
Feist’s The Psychology of Science and the Origins of the Scientific Mind (2006) made the case 
for a distinct sub-discipline of psychology. Feist made the intriguing argument that the 
psychological study of the scientific mind had already emerged de facto, but unacknowledged, 
and that all that was needed was to synthesise existing work in neuroscience, developmental 
psychology, cognitive psychology, personality psychology, and social psychology, into a 
discrete empirical study of scientific thought and behaviour through the use of these new 
perspectives in biological, developmental, cognitive, personality, social, and clinical 
psychology.6 Feist failed to excite much interest among his fellow psychologists, and historians 
were never likely to be sympathetic to his ahistorical understanding of science as primarily a 
cognitive activity, rooted in an immaterial psychology. But one feature of Feist’s work that 
ought to interest historians is the extent to which drew upon Darwin, both by using Darwin’s 
autobiography as a case study and in order to situate the scientific mind within a broader 
evolutionary history.7 As we shall see, this dual approach was precisely how Darwin himself 
had approached the problem. Unpacking Darwin’s formulation of the scientific mind, therefore, 
will make a contribution to a broader study – both historical and contemporary – of the cultural 
construction of the scientific mind.
The growing literature on the fashioning of scientific self in the second half of the nineteenth 
century has opened a space in which a detailed exploration of Darwin’s understanding of his 
own scientific mind might be pursued.8 The work of Jan Golinksi, Ruth Barton, and Heather 
Ellis, among others, demonstrates the value of looking at how nineteenth century scientists 
understood and framed their own psychology.9 Barton’s work, in particular, with its sensitivity 
to the hierarchical aspect of self-fashioning is especially helpful when considering Darwin’s 
understanding of his own scientific mind.10 Yet despite the oft-lamented ubiquity of Darwin in 
studies of Victorian science, it is noticeable that he is relatively absent from much of the recent 
work on self-fashioning, barely meriting a mention in Ellis’s Masculinity and Science (2017), 
for example.11 The two notable exceptions to this are Paul White’s study of Darwin and 
emotions and Alexis Harley’s intriguing and suggestive Autobiologies (2015), which 
emphasises the extent to which the later nineteenth-century self became ‘a biological subject’.12 
Even Harley, however, who gives considerable attention to Darwin’s ‘self narrativisation’, 
omits any discussion of the importance of Darwin’s understanding of the scientific mind in the 
framing of his 1876 ‘Recollections of the development of mind and character’. The resultant 
rare gap in the overpopulated field of Darwin studies would, in itself, provide a sufficient 
justification for taking Darwin as our case study. More importantly, as Feist appreciated, 
Darwin bequeathed us a document rich in self-analysis that historians are yet to exploit fully. 
We should not be misled by Darwin’s claim that he undertook his autobiography in the 
expectation that it ‘would amuse [him]’. Darwin’s greatest intellectual breakthrough, after all, 
was the result of reading Malthus ‘for amusement’, and writing the ‘Recollections’ was no 
frivolous undertaking.13 Autobiographies were, as Charlotte Sleigh has emphasised, a key 
element in the process of scientist’s self-fashioning; an exploration of Darwin’s understanding 
of the psychology of his own scientific mind will throw light upon the thinker and his thought.14
Darwin on Darwin’s Mind
Towards the end of May 1876, Darwin began the task of analyzing his own ‘frame of mind’ and 
delineating ‘the mental qualities and conditions’ upon which his achievements in science rested. 
Writing for ‘nearly an hour most afternoons’ for the next nine weeks, Darwin drafted a c.35,000 
word manuscript, under the title ‘Recollections of the development of my mind and character’, 
an edited version of which was first published posthumously in 1887.15 Although often 
presented as an ‘autobiography’, Darwin’s attempt to provide ‘some sketch’ of his life and 
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collate family anecdotes was, as his own chosen title indicates, secondary to his ambition to 
analyse his own mental character and development.16 The ‘Recollections’, that is, were 
primarily an exercise in metacognition, in which Darwin set out to think about his own 
thinking, and about the cognitive conditions of scientific success. This led him to identify the 
attributes that constituted his scientific mind, and the course of its development. Three years 
later, in his The Life of Erasmus Darwin (1879), he returned to the topic and explored the 
scientific mind of his paternal grandfather.17 At no point in either text did Darwin attempt an 
explicit definition, yet in both he identified the chief characteristics of a scientific mind, made 
clear his view that these characteristics were innate and hereditary, and passed judgement on 
those whom he considered possessed – or did not possess – minds that were scientific. That this 
has elicited so little discussion in the multitudinous outputs of the ‘Darwin industry’ is, in part, 
a consequence of the location of Darwin’s ideas. The ‘Recollections’ and Life of Erasmus are 
too often misread as end-of-life whimsy or of Darwin ‘relaxing into autobiographical and 
familial mode’, when they are better understood as integral parts of the overall intellectual 
project he began in the late 1830s, and to which he dedicated his adult life.18 
Darwin’s autobiographical writings and his natural science are ‘not separate or antithetical but 
mutually constitutive endeavours that nourish and interpenetrate one another’.19 Darwin 
straddled both the end of older natural history tradition, in which it was common to work from 
the individual and particular to the general, and a newer trend in which scientists interested in 
the human mind – including anthropologists, sociologists, ethnologists, psychologists, 
psychiatrists and eugenicists – made use of autobiographies for raw data.20 He wrote the 
‘Recollections’ and his Life of Erasmus at a time when the history of science was largely 
biographical, and autobiography was ‘a suitable tool’ with which to reflect on the nature of 
science, and when it was fashionable for scientists to furnish their life stories as case studies for 
their contemporaries.21 Twelve years earlier, for example, Charles Babbage had warned readers 
of his Passages from the Life of a Philosopher (1864) not to expect a conventional 
autobiography but rather the exploration of ‘a variety of isolated circumstances’ which 
illustrated human character; in his conclusion he gave explicit consideration to the mental 
training and  to the ‘peculiarities of mind [which] enabled [him] to accomplish what even the 
most instructed in their own sciences deemed impossible’.22 Babbage was also typical in his 
insistence that the Passages was complementary to, and ought to be read alongside, his 
scientific works. Perhaps the most famous and influential example of this, with which Darwin 
was certainly familiar, was John Stuart Mill’s Autobiography (1873), published less than three 
years before Darwin wrote his ‘Recollections’ and self-consciously conceived as a companion 
to his other writings.23 Herbert Spencer averred the same rationale for his autobiography: ‘it 
seemed to me that a natural history of myself would be a useful accompaniment to the books 
which it has been the chief occupation of my life to write’.24
In Darwin’s case, the ‘Recollections’ assumed knowledge of his other writings and culminated 
in an overview of the main publications that had constituted Darwin’s life. This was followed 
by self-analytical mini-essay of around 750 words, probably the result of Darwin’s final 
afternoon of writing the first draft on 3 August 1876, which summed up the character of the 
mind of the author.25  In providing a distillation of the argument he had developed throughout 
the manuscript, Darwin borrowed the structure of chapter summaries and concluding sections 
of which he often made use in his zoological and botanical writings. The mini-essay rehearsed 
his failings - a memory that was ‘extensive, yet hazy’, an inability ‘to follow a long and purely 
abstract train of thought’, and ‘no great quickness of apprehension or wit’ – before turning to 
‘the favourable side of the balance’, those qualities in which he considered himself ‘superior to 
the common run of men’. These were: independence and hard work; openness and flexibility of 
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mind; and the motivational qualities of drive and ambition. Although he claimed to have ‘never 
turned one inch out of my course to gain fame’, Darwin admitted that an ‘ambition to be 
esteemed by my fellow naturalists’ had accompanied his desire, evident from ‘early youth’, ‘to 
understand or explain whatever I observed, - that is, to group all facts under some general 
laws’. In addition to these specific qualities, Darwin identified his ‘love of science’, which he 
described as ‘steady and ardent’, as ‘the most important’ of the ‘complex diversified mental 
qualities and conditions’ of his success.26
The opening paragraph of the ‘Recollections’ announced Darwin’s intention to write as ‘a dead 
man in another world looking back at my own life’.27 This set the tone for the sparse and 
broadly chronological psychological self-analysis that followed, in which Darwin charted his 
earliest childhood memories and family relations; his boyhood behaviour, interests, and 
passions; and the limited impact of his formal education; but eschewed consideration of, for 
example, the emotional impact of his marriage or of fatherhood. For some later critics, this 
‘dead man’ approach created serious shortcomings of both style and content, and produced ‘a 
desultory assortment of anecdotes much more than the masterful marshalling of great moments 
in the life of a great man that might be expected’.28 George Levine, in particular, made much of 
Darwin’s extraordinary phrase and argued that the ‘Recollections’ was an autobiographical act 
of ‘effacement’, akin to the pursuit of mechanical objectivity in his wider work, in which the 
‘self is denied by the purgation from it of everything that is contingent, temporal, social, 
inherited, human’.29 For Darwin’s admirers, by contrast, the meticulously measured manner in 
which Darwin expressed himself in the ‘Recollections’ is a monument to his modesty.30 Both 
critics and admirers here miss the point. 
While Levine was undoubtedly correct to link the style and structure of the ‘Recollections’ to 
Darwin’s science, the very act of a scientist’s writing an autobiography constituted, as Sleigh 
has noted, an implicit ‘rejection’ of the self-abnegation demanded by mechanical objectivity.31 
The ‘Recollections’ is built around Darwin’s first person, subjective judgements, although his 
scientific understanding makes him wary of his own conclusions. As revealing as the ‘dead 
man’ quote is Darwin’s comment towards the end of the ‘Recollections’ when, having 
announced his intention to ‘try to analyse’ his mental qualities, he immediately conceded, ‘I am 
aware that no man can do this correctly’.32 Darwin was painfully aware that his judgements 
could be wrong, and this is why he peppered the ‘Recollections’ with phrases such as ‘as far as 
I can judge’, ‘as far as I can see’, and ‘as far as I remember’. Rather than modesty, or sympathy 
with a broader mid-Victorian concern with honesty in autobiography, this textual tic expressed 
the compound of Darwin’s doubts about the introspective method and the reliability of the brain 
as an evolved organ.33 
Darwin shared in the prevailing objection to introspective judgements, expressed most clearly 
in Auguste Comte’s dictum: ‘The thinking individual cannot cut itself in two – one of the parts 
reasoning, while the other is looking on’.34 This Comtean concern was almost certainly 
refreshed and reinforced for Darwin in the years preceding the writing of the ‘Recollections’ by 
his reading of Henry Maudsley, who cautioned the need ‘to guard against the common 
metaphysical conception of mind, by recognising the true subjective character of the 
conception’.35 Darwin shared Maudsley’s concern and did not go the whole way with Comte in 
regarding the psychological method as ‘entirely worthless’.36 His position was essentially that 
later adopted by G. H. Lewes, that ‘while limiting the claims of introspection, we need not deny  
their validity’.37  Allied to Darwin’s doubts about the introspective method, and further 
tempering his judgements in the ‘Recollections’, was Darwin’s distrust of the reliability of any 
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human mind, as an evolutionary product, to fully grasp its own situation. In his ‘1844 Sketch’, 
Darwin had identified the mind’s limitations as an obstacle to the acceptance of evolutionary 
theory.38 In the ‘Recollections’ he found the human mind equally untrustworthy on the question 
of religion when, having noted his own weakening theism, he commented: ‘But then arises the 
doubt - can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low 
as that possessed by the lowest animal, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions?’39  
The tentative tone of the ‘Recollections’ expressed neither purgation nor humility so much as 
the seriousness of its scientific task.40
Although Linda Peterson judged the ‘Recollections’ to be no more than a partial foreshadowing 
of more ‘serious attempts’, by Darwin’s successors to write scientific autobiography, this 
underestimates the extent to which Darwin consciously plotted a parallel between the ‘growth 
of the human mind viewed as a whole’ and the development of his own individual mental 
organisation. This was another Comtean inheritance refreshed and reinforced in the 1860s and 
1870s, this time in the work of Ernst Haeckel and John Lubbock, and implicit in Darwin’s 
account of his own mental development is a recapitulation of the evolutionary growth of the 
human mind.41 Thus Darwin traces his childhood as an ascent from a ‘savage’ state of theft, 
lying, and cruelty, to the morally upstanding humanity of the civilized scientist.42 
Looking backwards, I can now perceive how my love for science gradually 
preponderated over every other taste. During the first two years my old passion for 
shooting survived in nearly full force, and I shot myself all the birds and animals for my 
collection; but gradually I gave up my gun more and more, and finally altogether to my 
servant, as shooting interfered with my work, more especially with making out the 
geological structure of a country. I discovered, though unconsciously and insensibly, 
that the pleasure of observing and reasoning was a much higher one than that of skill 
and sport. The primeval instincts of the barbarian slowly yielded to the acquired tastes 
of the civilized man.43 
The presumed parallel between human ascent to civilisation and the preponderance of Darwin’s 
‘love of science’ is unmistakeable. His trajectory was gradual – Darwin used the word 
‘gradually’ more than ten times in the ‘Recollections’ – and mirrored the evolutionary history 
of the human mind. For just as Darwin understood his own mind developing to become steadily 
more scientific, so too did he think that this was the path for the species in general. This point is 
easily missed. In almost all of his writings on humans Darwin’s primary focus was upon 
demonstrating continuity with non-human animals, by identifying the rudiments of human 
mentality in animals and the remnants of animality in humans.44 But at one point in the Descent 
of Man (1871) Darwin permitted himself a brief look up at the higher mental development of 
humans, and found ‘a perfect gradation from the mind of an utter idiot, lower than that of the 
lowest animal, to the mind of a Newton’.45 In the Descent, that is, Darwin made ‘the mind of a 
Newton’, a scientific mind, the highest human attainment; while in the ‘Recollections’, he 
charted his own mental development towards a scientific mind, humanity’s highest 
evolutionary point. This ought to be borne in mind every time the ‘Recollections’ is praised or 
criticized for its author’s supposed modesty.
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Innate taste and education
Darwin’s sense that he was predestined for science was longstanding: in an autobiographical 
fragment written in August 1838 he had declared: ‘I was born a naturalist’.46 Thirty-eight years later, 
in the ‘Recollections’, he explained his scientific mind through the development of what he saw as 
his ‘clearly innate’ ‘taste for natural history’. This assumption of ‘innateness’ shaped Darwin’s 
account of his life. Events and encounters which, viewed differently, might have been rendered 
revelatory epiphanies – such as Robert Grant explaining Lamarckism or Darwin’s first reading of 
Herschel – were acknowledged only insofar as they stimulated or awakened a natural ‘passion’ or 
‘stirred up … a burning zeal to add even the most humble contribution to the noble structure of 
Natural Science’. His scientific habits, such as his love of collecting, Darwin stressed, predated his 
formal education, and the impact of that education was dismissed almost casually: school was 
underwhelming, university lectures ‘intolerably dull’.47 This reflected something deeper than 
Darwin’s own individual experience. Politically, it represented a polemical identification with the 
attack of T. H. Huxley and other scientists upon the dominance of classical learning in formal 
education; philosophically, it expressed Darwin’s rejection of Lockean and Hartleyean 
sensationalist psychology, which led him to conclude that ‘education and environment produce only 
a small effect on the mind, and that most of our qualities are innate’.48 Not that Darwin was 
completely insensitive to the argument that non-psychological factors had contributed to his 
success. He was, for example, aware that economic wealth had given him ‘ample leisure from not 
having to earn my own bread’, and he was paradoxically grateful for the ill health that had saved 
him from ‘the distractions of society and amusement’.49 Such factors, however, were significant 
only to the extent that they had allowed Darwin to indulge his ‘love of science - unbounded 
patience in long reflecting over any subject - industry in observing and collecting facts’ and it was 
these innate qualities, combined with  ‘a fair share of invention as well as of common-sense’, 
which, Darwin judged, constituted his scientific mind.50
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Even innate ability and predisposition, however, required development; and development, in turn, 
required time, training, and habit. This is an important point to which we will return; for the 
moment we only need to note that again, Darwin seems to have been drawing upon Maudsley, who 
presented the brain as an organ that could be developed, strengthened, or weakened. Whereas other 
internal organs, such as the liver and the heart, were capable from birth of full functionality, the 
brain ‘matured by insensible degrees in the course of life’. It was ‘born equal’ only to its basic 
organic function; ‘its highest development’ took time, with both the brain and human intelligence 
following ‘the same gradual progress from the general to the special’.51 This, said Maudsley, was 
particularly important for those working in science where ‘the scientific imagination by which 
hypotheses are successively framed until a true one is obtained, its verification completed, and a 
discovery thus made, is based upon a previous careful training of the senses in scientific 
observation, and works by means of sensory representations’. Taking up the cudgels against 
sensationalist psychology, Maudsley maintained that those with the greatest insights into nature saw 
beyond immediate sense impressions. An ordinary mind ‘in describing scenery or events, will give 
a tedious picture characterised by minute industry and overwrought detail, in which there is no due 
subordination of parts, no organic unity of idea - in which truly soul is wanting - and from which, 
therefore, no one can carry away a true idea of the whole’. The ‘truer man of science’, according to 
Maudsley, was able to go beyond ‘the cultivation of careful habits of observation’ to achieve ‘the 
co-operation of the sensory centres’ in intellectual action.52 This higher stage required both innate 
ability and training.
Hence a motif of the ‘Recollections’ was the process by which, through time, training, and habit, 
Darwin’s consistent ‘love of science’ - which explained both his initial passion and his commitment 
to improvement - had ‘gradually preponderated over every other taste’. This phrase  ‘love of 
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science’ appears twice in the ‘Recollections’ - supplemented by one of ‘love of natural science’ and 
one ‘love of natural history’ - and can also be found in Darwin’s correspondence.53 Darwin’s use of 
it was neither unique nor original. The phrase was most closely associated with Alexander von 
Humboldt, who referred to a ‘love of science’ in his Personal Narrative and who was, in turn, 
praised by Babbage for having ‘loved and pursued science for its own sake’.54  Humboldt also 
seems to have introduced Darwin to the phrase, describing himself as acting ‘avec toute la pureté de 
l’amour des sciences’, in a letter to Darwin dated September 1839.55 Thereafter, Darwin would 
frequently praise correspondents variously for their ‘love of science’, their ‘love for science’, or 
their ‘pure love of science’.56 On a psychological level, the phrase implied an enthusiasm that was 
all-consuming and, in Darwin’s hands at least, an evolutionary progression. As we have seen, he 
described how, during the Beagle voyage, the ‘primeval instincts of the barbarian slowly yielded to 
the acquired tastes of the civilized man’, and this process continued upon his return, reaching 
completion by the time he moved to Downe in 1842, at which point ‘scientific work’ became ‘the 
chief enjoyment and sole employment’ of his life. Thereafter his mind was exclusively scientific: ‘a 
kind of machine for grinding general laws out of large collections of facts’.57 Of course, at Down 
House Darwin was able to work without any obligations and the frequent use of the prefix ‘pure’ 
highlights the moral aspect of the ‘love of science’: it is an activity untainted by commercial or 
financial consideration. This was Humboldt’s meaning in his letter to Darwin, and, in turn, 
Darwin’s meaning when, in 1862, he praised the science writer W. B. Tegetmeier for his ‘pure and 
disinterested love of science’.58 
In the ‘Recollections’, Darwin mainly defined the scientific mind in relation to his own positive 
attributes, including his ‘love of science’, but equally revealingly he also noted the absence of a 
scientific mind in others. The starkest contrast was with Thomas Carlyle, of whom he said: ‘I never 
met a man with a mind so ill adapted for scientific research’. It was not simply that Carlyle 
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‘despised’ all branches of science and held ‘revolting’ views about slavery; the real problem was 
that Carlyle’s mind was ‘very narrow’, and his ‘extraordinary power of drawing vivid pictures of 
things and men’ was reckless as to accuracy and truth.59 This, of course, was at odds with the 
mental qualities of independence, openness, and observational skills which Darwin thought the 
hallmark of a science. Perhaps more illuminating, however, in helping us to understand Darwin’s 
use of the term, was the contrast he drew with his own father, whose mind possessed some of the 
attributes of a scientist but who did not ‘possess, as I think, a scientific mind’.60 
This striking, but rarely noticed, claim might be used as evidence of Darwin’s Freudian rebellion 
against his father or, more interestingly, as Darwin anticipating, in his own way, the supposedly new 
autobiographical form that would be created by Edmund Gosse’s Father and Son (1907): ‘a memoir 
in which writers seek self-definition by contrasting their own life with their father’s’.61 But even if 
we restrict our interest more narrowly to Darwin’s definition of a scientific mind, it is a remarkable 
remark.  Robert Darwin, after all, was a distinguished doctor, an elected fellow of the Royal 
Society, and, on Darwin’s account, an ‘acute observer’. What made his mind, ‘not scientific’, 
according to his son, was that ‘he did not try to generalize his knowledge under general laws’.62 
This was the same distinction that Maudsley made in his Physiology and Pathology, between a man 
who ‘records, with a praiseworthy but tedious industry, the unconnected impressions made upon his 
senses, and never gets further than that’, and the ‘truer man of science’ who combines ‘by means of 
the organizing power of idea, the scattered impressions made upon the senses, [and] is able by 
comparison to complement or correct the impression made on a particular sense’.63
Whence Darwin’s innate talent came was not addressed directly in the ‘Recollections’.64 In noting 
that some of his own sons ‘also exhibited an apparently innate taste for science’, Darwin implied 
hereditary transmission, but he also explicitly discounted any debt to his own father: ‘I do not think 
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that I gained much from him intellectually’.65 In his Life of Erasmus, Darwin identified his paternal 
grandfather as the probable source of his own innate ‘desire to collect objects of natural history, and 
feted Erasmus for possessing ‘the true spirit of a philosopher’, an ‘incessant activity’ of mind’, and 
a ‘vividness’ of imagination which ‘led to his great originality of thought, his prophetic spirit both 
in science and in the mechanical arts, and to his overpowering tendency to theorise and generalise’. 
For evidence of these traits, Darwin cited a letter from a friend, written in the wake of Erasmus’s 
death, which delineated traits very similar to those Darwin had identified in himself in the 
‘Recollections’, including: independence of character, ‘uncommon activity of mind and facility of 
exertion’, and quick perception of the ‘analogies on which a new theory could be founded’.66 He 
also considered the extent to which Erasmus had ‘transmitted his characteristic qualities to his 
children’; concluding that Erasmus’s eldest son, also called Charles, had ‘inherited from his father a 
strong taste for various branches of science’, but that Erasmus’s second son Robert, Darwin’s own 
father, had not inherited ‘any aptitude for poetry or mechanics’.67 The clear implication was that the 
hereditary root of Darwin’s own innate scientific ability was an example of the broader hereditary 
phenomenon in which grandchildren manifested the attributes of grandparents, despite their absence 
of similar attributes in the intervening generation. This was a subject Darwin discussed in his books 
Variation in Animals and Plants under Domestication (1868) and in The Expression of the Emotions 
in Men and Animals (1872), but which he had first broached at the start of his career in the ‘mental 
rioting’ of his post-Beagle notebooks.68 
Early interest
As with so many other aspects of his thought, the foundations of Darwin’s view of the scientific 
mind were laid in that extraordinarily rich period of the late 1830s when he first formulated his 
theory of evolution by natural selection.69 As early as February 1838, in Notebook B, Darwin 
identified ‘mind heredity’ as part of his programme for exploration.70 The ‘Metaphysics 
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Notebooks’ (M and N), moreover, which Darwin filled out in parallel with ‘Transmutation 
Notebooks’ (D and E), were almost entirely concerned with the evolution of man and his mental 
faculties.71 The importance of human psychology to the early development of Darwin’s theory is 
easily overlooked, not least because of the suggestion in the Origin that psychology was a field for 
future studies.72 Yet the evidence of his notebooks is that for a short but highly significant period, 
between opening Notebook M in July 1838 and reading Malthus in October 1838, Darwin’s 
thinking was dominated by questions of human psychology.73 This early interest, moreover, was 
every bit as personal and familial as the later ‘Recollections’ and Life of Erasmus, and prefigured 
those publications in some important respects. 
In August 1838, aged only 29, Darwin sketched the beginnings of his first autobiography. This was 
an attempt to catalogue his earliest recollections as a means to understand his memory and how it 
related to his self-perception, and was almost certainly prompted by his father’s remark, recorded in 
Notebook M, that ‘people of weak minds, below par in intellect have very bad memories for things 
which happened in early infancy’.74 He recalled that remark again almost forty years later in the 
second paragraph of the ‘Recollections’.75 Indeed, drawing upon insights from his father is a 
common feature of both the Notebooks and Darwin’s more mature writings. Notebook M opened 
with the words ‘My father’, concluded with the same phrase, and used it twenty-two times in-
between. The very first entry set the tone: ‘My father has seen innumerable cases of people taking 
after their parents, when the latter died long before, that it is extremely improbable that they should 
have imitated’.76 A few pages in and Darwin was considering inheritance within his own family: 
‘My father says, perfect deformity, as an extra number of fingers.- hare lip or imperfect roof to the 
mouth stammering in my Father family (as in Lord Berwick’s family) are hereditary’.77 
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Thereafter, Darwin became particularly interested in the hereditary connection between 
grandfathers and grandsons, and explored inheritance primarily in terms of ‘grandfathers’. First, he 
became fascinated by the possibility of reversion, and the final entry in Notebook M posed a 
question: ‘Has my Father ever known disease in grandchild, when father has not had it but where 
grandfather was the cause by his intemperance’.78 Second, he began to use the term ‘grandfather’ as 
shorthand for all evolutionary ancestors. In early December 1838, for example, the first of the three 
principles he formulated that would, he said, ‘account for all’ was that ‘Grandchildren like 
grandfathers’.79 By this he meant both the literal resemblance across two generations – for which he 
asked his father for examples– and a more general evolutionary inheritance. Thus he summed up his 
evolutionary explanation of man’s ‘evil passions’ as ‘The Devil under form of Baboon is our 
grandfather!’80 Third, and stimulating his interest, was Darwin’s growing conviction of his own 
inheritance from Erasmus. Thus he took the similarity of his and his grandfather’s handwriting as 
symbolic: ‘Handwriting is determined by most complicated circumstances as shown by difficulty in 
forging, yet handwriting said to be hereditary, shows well what minute details of structure are 
hereditary’.81 
The relationship between grandfathers and grandchildren was similarly prominent in Darwin’s work 
thirty years later in the Variation, when he outlined his pangenesis hypothesis.82 Examples of human 
psychology, mental illness, and inheritance furnished by his father again featured heavily, as did a 
concern with reversion. There was, Darwin noted, a ‘great principle of inheritance’, long recognised 
by agriculturists and expressed in a variety of languages, by which offspring resemble an ancestor 
more closely than either of their immediate parents, and a grandparent more than either parent.83 
Darwin made the same point in the Expression, in the case of an English girl who, despite never 
meeting her French grandfather, resembled him ‘to an almost absurd degree’ and developed a Gallic 
shrug at only eighteen months of age.84 Beneath the continuity between the Notebooks and the 
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Variation and Expression, however, Darwin had modified his understanding of reversion. In March 
1863, he told Joseph Hooker that he had spent the past fortnight writing about reversions and 
gathered a ‘curious collection of facts & experiments’, which ‘have led me to view the whole case 
rather differently i.e. that the child never inherits from its grandfather or more distant ancestor, but 
that a crowd of characters lie latent in every living creature & parent.85 Hooker asked for 
clarification: ‘I do not understand you in saying that the child inherits nothing from its Grandparents 
except you mean (what I think you imply) that the Gndparents’ properties, if developed by the 
grdchild, were latent in the parent—& which I entirely believe’.86 Darwin was happy to agree that 
this was precisely what he meant.87
This refinement notwithstanding, there is a remarkable similarity between Darwin’s treatment of the 
topic in his later writings and that in Notebook M. This is particularly true of the examples of 
human inheritance he cites in the Variation, some of which were even prefaced with the phrase ‘my 
father’ – which appears nine times across the Variation – and his revisiting of the question of the 
inheritance of handwriting.88 The Variation, that is, marked a return, thirty years on, to the question 
of human psychology and psychological inheritance. This interest then gathered pace with the 
publication of the Descent of Man (1871) and The Expression (1872). Indeed, in outline the content 
of these two books broadly mirrors that of Notebooks M and N.89 The apparent late flowering of 
Darwin’s interest in the human mind and inheritance is, therefore, more accurately seen as a 
rediscovery of his earlier interests, with little new added.90 Although he had avoided direct 
discussion of humans in the Origin on the grounds that it would ‘have been useless and injurious to 
the success of the book to have paraded without giving any evidence my conviction’, when he did 
finally publish on humans it was without having undertaken any research comparable to the eight-
year immersion in Cirripedia which preceded the Origin.91 
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But why, we might ask, did Darwin discontinue his psychological interests in the late-1830s, only to 
choose to return to them over thirty years later?
The first part of this question can be answered fairly easily: the key to the initial abeyance was 
Darwin’s October 1838 reading of Malthus. Darwin’s interest in mental processes had been 
prompted by the fact that ‘these seemed to be the most rapidly modified of all biological functions, 
and therefore the most useful for testing the “Lamarckian” idea of the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics’.92 At this point Darwin’s position was essentially Lamarckian, and his focus was on 
man as a ‘frontier instance’ - ‘an opportunity to study intelligence as a central feature of adaptive 
change, and to study it in that organism in which it was most prominent’ - and, therefore, to argue 
(downwards) for psychological continuity ‘from man to animals’.93 Once he had read Malthus, 
however, Darwin had a mechanism for selection, which meant that actual instances of inheritance, 
including the vexed questions of human psychology, could be put to one side.94  Hence the 
exclusive focus, in the 1842 and 1844 sketches, and in the Origin, upon plants and animals. Darwin, 
as Gruber put it, ‘by choosing to remain a biologist, “failed” to become a systematic 
psychologist’.95
Darwin’s return to the topic of man – tentatively in Variation, unapologetically in Descent and 
Expression, and then most fully in the ‘Recollections’ and Life of Erasmus – has been explained in 
at least two different ways. Desmond and Moore, in their book Darwin’s Sacred Cause, argue that 
Darwin was driven by a desire to clarify his opposition to polygenesis; while Harely explains the 
return to human psychology as rooted in a wish to foreground sympathy and to temper the 
excessive individualism of the Origin.96 Without disputing the partial truth of either interpretation, I 
would suggest that Darwin’s return to his apparently abandoned interests, also owed much to the 
changing cultural and intellectual context of studies of the mind; certainly, it had relatively little to 
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do with Darwin’s own research. There were personal reasons behind the writing of both books – the 
news that he was going to become a grandfather prompted Darwin to start the ‘Recollections’, and 
the absence of a ‘good biographer’ motivated the Life of Erasmus – but it is also notable that direct 
enquiries from German publishers preceded both books, indicating an appetite for what Darwin was 
to write.97 Whereas there was no obvious interest in, or outlet for, Darwin’s psychological studies in 
the 1830s and 1840s, the post-Origin orgy of attempts to apply evolution to humans meant that 
across the 1860s and 1870s a space in which to explore such ideas was increasingly carved out.98 
At first Darwin considered simply incorporating ‘all of his material on human evolution into a 
single chapter on “man” (the most domesticated animal) in his book Variation’, but then delayed 
again until the Descent: ‘when I found that many naturalists fully accepted the doctrine of the 
evolution of species, it seemed to me advisable to work up such notes as I possessed and to publish 
a special treatise on the origin of man’.99 With that task complete he found other old notes to work 
up. One set became Darwin’s ‘A Biographical Sketch of An Infant’ (1877), which was based on the 
study he had made of the early months of the life of his first son William in 1840. The inspiration 
for that particular study also had its roots in Notebook M where Darwin had made various remarks 
on the behaviour of the child of his brother-in-law, Hensleigh Wedgwood.100 But it took the 
foundation of Mind in 1876, and the magazine’s translation of Hippolyte Taine’s account of his own 
daughter’s acquisition of language, in early 1877, to prompt Darwin into print.101  Similarly with 
Darwin’s writings on the scientific mind, the roots reached back to the late 1830s but it took a 
change in environment for them to flower in the mid to late 1870s. A key contributor to that 
changing environment was, of course, Darwin’s half-cousin Francis Galton. 
Galton’s Men of Science
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It is impossible to write about the scientific mind without reference to Galton. As Feist noted, 
Galton’s English Men of Science: Their Nature and Nurture (1874) was the seminal study.102 The 
book grew out of Galton’s earlier work on ‘hereditary genius’ and his critical review of Alphonse de 
Candolle’s Histoire des sciences et des savants depuis deux siècles (1873).103 Whereas de Candolle 
explained the success of Geneva’s men of science by a combination of historical and sociological 
factors, Galton offered ‘a Natural History of the English Men of Science of the present day’, which 
emphasized the biological and hereditarian basis of the scientific mind.104 His research method was 
a seven-page questionnaire sent to around 180 leading ‘men of science’ seeking information on four 
main areas: ‘their earliest antecedents, including hereditary influences’; ‘the inborn quality of their 
mind and body’; the ‘causes that first induced them to pursue science’; and ‘the education they 
received and their opinions on its merits’.105 The recipients were selected from elected Fellows of 
the Royal Society, plus one or two associated clubs. On the basis of responses from about half of 
those surveyed, Galton delineated a psychology of science, in which a hereditarily rooted 
behavioural consistency was key.106 Galton did not attempt a strict definition of a ‘man of science’ – 
on the good Darwinian grounds that natural groups ‘have nuclei but no outlines; they blend of every  
side’ – but argued that they were distinguished not only by the fact that they loved science, but that 
they loved her consistently.107 Whereas a ‘normal’ pattern was for a man’s tastes to change across 
his lifetime - from ‘inquiry in childhood’, to ‘fierce passions in youth’, and then ‘ambitions of more 
mature life’ - ‘a special taste for science seems to be so ingrained in the constitution of scientific 
men, that it asserts itself throughout their whole existence’.108 Thus, in a comforting confirmation of 
what he had set out to prove, Galton’s data demonstrated that ‘scientific tastes appear to have been 
innate’.109 
As we have seen, this is very similar to the language Darwin deployed in the ‘Recollections’, and it 
would be easy to assume that Galton was a significant influence. Darwin, after all, wrote the 
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‘Recollections’ three years after receiving Galton’s questionnaire and two years after reading Men 
of Science, and was a guarded admirer of aspects of Galton’s work, referring favourably to his half-
cousin in both the ‘Recollections’ and the Life of Erasmus.110 Galton, for his part, identified a 
hereditary propensity towards ‘a love of natural history and theory, and of an aptitude for collecting 
facts in business-like but peculiar ways’ in the Darwin family, and declared that Darwin’s Origin 
had marked an ‘epoch in my own mental development’.111 Yet as obvious as this connection is, to 
conclude that Darwin followed Galton’s lead would be wrong. Not only did Darwin’s interest in his 
own mental development predate Galton’s work, but also the two men had significant 
methodological and ideological differences in their approach to the study of the scientific mind.
Methodologically, Galton championed an introspective approach with which Darwin, as we saw 
above, had little sympathy, and was possessed by an overwhelming desire to quantify ‘genius’.112 In 
the covering letter accompanying his questionnaire, Galton argued that ‘none are more likely to 
appreciate the inquiry or to give correct information than Men of Science’, and in the resultant book 
declared that their returns bore ‘all the marks of a cool and careful self-analysis’.113 Darwin, 
however, pointedly passed his copy of the questionnaire to his son George to fill out on his behalf, 
on the grounds that it is ‘impossible for any one to judge about his own character’.114  Darwin was 
probably more sympathetic to the criticism of one reviewer, Francis Lloyd, who complained that in 
citing ‘the confessions of a few individuals as a basis for exact conclusions’, Galton erred ‘as wildly 
as those of the ancient Greeks who accepted oral traditions and travellers’ stories as objective 
truth’.115 Galton, however, had wanted to go even further. In his Royal Institution lecture of 
February 1874, he had argued that his questionnaires would enable him to undertake a quantitative 
analysis, by having his respondents estimate their abilities by ‘degrees’, in line with the table of 
‘Natural Gifts’ he had developed in Hereditary Genius.116 By the time he published, Galton had 
abandoned the idea in favour of a less precise language of words such as ‘large’ and 
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‘considerable’.117 Darwin, it seems, was not alone in telling Galton: ‘I find it quite impossible to 
estimate my character by your degrees’.118
Ideologically, Darwin and Galton were separated by the gulf between the former’s optimistic 
liberalism and the latter’s pessimistic conservatism.119 As in all his writings, Galton’s Hereditary 
Genius and English Men of Science were both underpinned by fear of a future in which all forms of 
genius, including the scientific mind, were under threat from a differential decline in the birth rate. 
He argued that the marriages of the parents of the scientific men on his list ‘tended to produce 
differentation and purity of race’, but worried that men of science had fewer children and that this 
created a clear ‘tendency to an extinction of the families of men who work hard with the brain’.120 
At times, Darwin too expressed concern about a differential decline in the birth rate, but ultimately 
he harboured fewer worries that men of genius would not produce progeny (perhaps as a result of 
his own fabulous fecundity, compared with Galton’s childless marriage).121 More generally, in the 
Descent Darwin repeatedly distanced himself from Galton’s pessimism by looking confidently 
towards an evolutionary future in which ‘virtuous habits will grow stronger, becoming perhaps 
fixed by inheritance’ and ‘the struggle between our higher and lower impulses will be less severe, 
and virtue will be triumphant’.122 In Darwin’s optimistic view, the triumph of the scientific mind 
was part of this more assured general progression.
The most important difference between Darwin and Galton in their understanding of the scientific 
mind, however, came in their relative appreciation of the importance of hard work. Francis 
Darwin’s editing of the ‘Recollections’ exaggerated the image of his father as a ‘self-made man of 
the nineteenth century’ whose ‘life exemplified effort, achievement, and personal virtue in the face 
of difficulty’, but Darwin himself had laid the basis for this presentation.123 Even after declaring 
that he was inclined ‘to agree with Galton in believing that education and environment produce only  
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a small effect on the mind of any one, and that most of our qualities are innate’, Darwin emphasized 
the importance of hard work.124  Writing to Galton, after having read the first fifty pages of 
Hereditary Genius in 1869, Darwin seemed to be seeking a middle way: ‘You have made a convert 
of an opponent in one sense, for I have always maintained that, excepting fools, men did not differ 
much in intellect, only in zeal and hard work; and I still think this is an eminently important 
difference’.125 
Thus a recurring refrain of the ‘Recollections’ is how hard and how ‘steadily’ Darwin had worked. 
This was consistent with his admiration for Samuel Smiles’s biographies, which he always read, he 
told their author, with ‘extreme pleasure’.126 Whatever else he took from these books, Darwin 
undoubtedly imbibed a sense of work as an inherent moral good; thus in the ‘Recollections’, he 
noted that whenever he discovered himself to have ‘blundered’ or to have been unfairly praised or 
criticized, ‘it has been my greatest comfort to say hundreds of times to myself that  “I have worked 
as hard and as well as I could, and no man can do more than this.”’ The highest praise Darwin could 
find for his close friend Joseph Hooker was that he was ‘the most untirable worker that I have ever 
seen’. 127 Harley maintained that Darwin’s emphasis on hard work pushed him away from 
‘recognisably “Darwinian” accounts of how character is caused’ and towards a Protestant tradition 
of personal responsibility and liberal individualism, but this dichotomy is too stark.128 As we have 
seen, Darwin regards the characteristics of such a mind as innate, but there realisation was not 
inevitable. In choosing the noun ‘development’ to describe the process at work in the 
‘Recollections’ – these were ‘Recollections of the Development of my Mind and Character’- 
Darwin was able to emphasise both an embryological unrolling (the prevailing biological 
understanding of the word) and an active willing, realised through training. The ‘work’ that he 
lauded was not work for work’s sake, but the scientific practice of experiment. 
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For Darwin, the scientific mind was pre-eminently an experimental mind, and because experiments 
entailed ‘work’ they represented a point of elision between morality and methodology. This was 
another divergence from Galton, who made only rare forays into experimentation and represented 
the start of a new mathematical and statistically-based approach to scientific inquiry. Darwin, by 
contrast, followed inductivist principles in stressing the importance of experimentalism to the 
scientific mind.129 Thus in his Life of Erasmus, Darwin noted that although his grandfather 
‘indulged largely in hypotheses’, it was the fact that he ‘knew full well the value of experiment’ that 
showed that he possessed the ‘true spirit of a philosopher’. He also quoted approvingly his 
grandfather’s definition of a fool as ‘a man who never tried an experiment in his life’. 130 Darwin 
never called Herbert Spencer an outright fool, but time and again in their correspondence he and 
Hooker lamented Spencer’s unwillingness to put in the hard graft of observation and experiment.131 
In the ‘Recollections’ he characterized Spencer as possessing an ‘extremely egotistical’ mind that 
shied away from hard, experimental work: ‘over and over again’, Darwin complained, ‘I have said 
to myself, after reading one of his discussions, – “here would be a fine subject for half-a-dozen 
years’ work.”’. That some imagined Spencer’s ‘fundamental generalisations’ comparable ‘with 
Newton’s laws!” was, for Darwin, absurd; the synthetic philosopher’s ‘deductive manner’ was, 
Darwin said, ‘wholly opposed to my frame of mind’.132 
Indubitably Galton’s questionnaire and his subsequent publications encouraged Darwin to think 
about the question of the scientific mind. Galton was, after all, one of the most important figures in 
the new intellectual firmament in which questions of mind, talent, and inheritance, and their 
interrelationships, came to be discussed, and it was within the space that Galton helped to create 
that Darwin revived his own earlier interests of the 1830s. Darwin, however, owed no specific debt 
to English Men of Science, and notably avoided adopting that ‘convenient jingle of words’, the 
‘nature/nurture’ dichotomy, which was the book’s enduring bequest to subsequent psychologists.133 
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The significance of the book for Darwin lay less in its specific arguments and more in the change of 
the tone it embodied. As Richard Yeo noted, Galton’s unapologetic ability to single out ‘men of 
science’ was itself a ‘mark of the consolidation which had taken place in the status of science during 
the nineteenth century’. Prior to Galton, metascientific discourse had been dominated by William 
Whewell’s natural theology and framed by the fact that ‘science was a relatively insecure cultural 
activity’. 134 Whewell’s focus had been on questions of morality, method, and the history of 
scientific discovery. Galton’s was on inheritance and biological explanations. His half-cousin’s 
work emboldened Darwin, but equally he never entirely escaped key aspects of the Whewellian 
perspective in which he had learned his trade and, as a result, Darwin’s conception of the scientific 
mind encompassed a mid-century metascience concern with moral character alongside a more 
obviously Galtonian emphasis on hereditary. 
Thus when Darwin identified Newton as the epitome of the scientific mind, he was praising more 
than a set of psychological predispositions or innate intellectual attributes. As Rebekah Higgitt has 
shown, in the early and mid-nineteenth century, Newton was rendered the exemplar of the morality 
and method of science by presenting him as a scientific ‘artisan’. The inductivism for which 
Newton was lauded was both methodologically correct and morally sound, because it represented a 
hardworking, labour-intensive route to knowledge.135 The Newton of the nineteenth century, that is, 
was celebrated for slogging his way to scientific insight. This ‘British’ approach – which was often 
contrasted with the ‘French’ model of a mercurial savant – left little room for inspirational genius, 
and emphasised careful rather than quick minds, and perseverance and sustained reflection over 
memory and quick reflexes. These, of course, were precisely the attributes that Darwin self-
identified in the ‘Recollections’. This was very different to Galton, whose emphasis on innate 
genius placed a much lower premium on hard work and made a much lower estimate of what could 
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be achieved by diligence, application, and sheer slogging. Revealingly, English Men of Science 
made no mention of Newton. 
The scientific mind and the religious mind
While Darwin shared aspects of Whewell’s vision of the scientist as a moral exemplar of strict 
method and hard working habit, he parted company from his former friend on the question of 
religion and the scientific mind.136 For Whewell, a scientific mind and a religious mind were not 
only compatible, they were reinforcing elements in the overarching Divine Mind. In his 
Bridgewater Treatise – Astronomy and General Physics considered with reference to Natural 
Theology – he developed this point to argue that inductive habits of mind were of greater value than 
deductive, in both science and religion.137 In Whewell’s view, nature and mind would always 
‘correspond’ for the simple reason that both were ‘the works of the same Maker’ and that ‘the 
constitution of the world is marked with the Thoughts of the Divine Mind, and the human mind is, 
in part, a sharer in the Thoughts of the Divine Mind’.138 
One scientific autobiography, written two years before Darwin’s ‘Recollections’, which accorded 
with this view, was Mary Somerville’s Personal Recollections (1874). She, like Darwin, was 
hesitant but persistent in pursuing an introspective analysis of her own mental qualities – ‘No 
analysis is so difficult as that of one’s own mind, but I do not think I err much in saying that 
perseverance is a characteristic of mine’. However,unlike Darwin she found that ‘the natural bent’ 
of her mind reinforced, as Whewell argued it would, her religious belief. 
Nothing has afforded me so convincing a proof of the unity of the Deity as these purely 
mental conceptions of numerical and mathematical science which have been by slow 
degrees vouchsafed to man, and are still granted in these latter times by the Differential 
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Calculus and the Higher Algebra, all of which must have existed in that sublimely 
omniscient Mind from eternity.139
Darwin’s account throughout his ‘Recollections’ was rather different. In particular, the section on 
‘Religious Belief’ charts the contraction of his faith, as Scripture, Christianity, theism, and all 
‘chimerical hopes’ of discovering final causes, were cast aside one by one, in parallel with the 
development of his scientific mind.140 As we have already noted, consciously or not, Comte’s 
contention that ‘each of us contemplating his own history’ finds ‘a theologian in childhood, a 
metaphysician in youth, and a natural philosopher in manhood’ echoed through Darwin’s text, and 
seems to underpin his account of a purging of his theological and metaphysical beliefs as he fully 
embraced natural selection.141 
Darwin’s debt was perhaps not as obvious as that of Harriet Martineau, who drew from Comte a 
‘comprehensive substitute’ for the ‘biblical typology’ that usually gave coherence to 
autobiographical experiences, and divided her life, and structured her autobiography, into broadly 
equal theological, metaphysical, and positivistic stages.142 But implicit in Darwin’s account of his 
own mental development is a recapitulation of the evolutionary growth of the human mind. Thus 
Darwin’s highly selective choice of childhood anecdotes emphasizes those ‘savage’ or barbarian 
characteristics – lying, theft, and wanton cruelty to a puppy – that eventually give way to the 
morally upstanding characteristics of the a scientist, as the adult Darwin attains a state of 
‘civilisation’.143 He even reveals himself to be a child theologian in attributing his lightning speed, 
in running back and forth between home and school, to the prayers he offered to God.144 Whether or 
not this came directly from the parallel Comte drew between an individual mental organisation and 
the ‘growth of the human mind viewed as a whole’ matters less than its meaning, and the 
implication was clear: contra Whewell, pro Comte, Darwin saw his scientific mind and the 
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religious belief in an inverse relationship. For Darwin, the scientific mind could not be a religious 
mind, and the more scientific a mind became the less religious it was.
On balance, it seems reasonable to conclude that Comte influenced Darwin’s thinking on the 
scientific mind, and certainly there were good reasons why he might have been reticent about 
acknowledging this debt. Comte – or at least the version of Comte that Darwin derived indirectly 
from David Brewster’s article in the Edinburgh Review  – was prominent in the M and N Notebooks 
where, as we have seen, Darwin first formulated his understanding of the scientific mind.145 
Reading Brewster at the Athenaeum in August 1838 had been momentous enough to give Darwin a 
headache, which he cured with a dose of Dickens, and to lead him to send an excited letter to Lyell, 
declaring the review ‘capital’.146 More specifically, Darwin was impressed with the three-stage 
theory of development, and made use of it on a number of occasions throughout his life, even 
though Whewell had rejected it as unscientific.147 Thus the criticism Darwin made in Notebook N 
that ‘Zoology itself is now purely theological’, was echoed in an 1861 letter to Lyell in which 
Darwin complained that the response of Asa Gray and Herschel to the Origin ‘merely show that the 
subject in their minds is in Comte’s theological stage of science’.148
Herschel was one reason why Darwin might have been reluctant to acknowledge any debt to 
Comte. The force of Herschel’s attack on Comte in his 1845 Presidential Address to the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science, coming on top of Whewell’s acerbic assault in his 
introduction to his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840), meant, as Schweber put it, that any 
avowal of debt would have been ‘one more cross’ for Darwin to bear.149 Indeed, even without such 
an avowal, by the mid-1860s Comte was being used as a stick with which to beat Darwin – as well 
as Mill and Spencer – and it was, in part, to protect evolutionary science from becoming too tarred 
with a Comtean brush, that Huxley launched a preemptive attack in an eviscerating piece for the 
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Fortnightly Review.150 Darwin praised his friend’s ‘clever’ article, and said that it had cured his 
‘vague wish to read Comte’.151 Three years later, however, he told another correspondent that he 
had read Harriet Martineau’s The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte ‘& some other books on 
Comte’, and even in the immediate wake of Huxley’s article he risked his tempestuous friend’s ire 
by forwarding a critique of the Fortnightly Review on behalf of the ‘red-hot Comtist’, Vernon 
Lushington.152 This evidence of a Comtean connection is, of course, far from conclusive, but it is 
consistent with structure of the ‘Recollections’, and especially the section on ‘Religious Belief’, 
which leaves no place for religion in the scientific mind. 
That is not to say that Darwin thought the scientific mind necessarily an atheistic mind. Darwin, of 
course, famously stopped short of declaring himself an atheist – ‘I have never been an atheist in the 
sense of denying the existence of a God’, as he put it in a letter of 1879 – and, in the 
‘Recollections’ declared: ‘The mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble by us; and I for 
one must be content to remain an Agnostic’.153 It is important to be clear what Darwin is saying 
here, because his words might be over-interpreted by those eager to reconcile Darwinism and 
religion. Not denying the existence of a God and allowing that a mystery is ‘insoluble’, is not 
equivalent to seriously entertaining the proposition that there might be a God or that the solution to 
the ‘mystery’ might be a supernatural one. Rather than a theological statement of his openness to 
potential supernatural explanations, Darwin was asserting the methodological and psychological 
openness required of a scientific mind. Agnosticism for Huxley, who popularised – and almost 
certainly prompted Darwin’s use of – the term, meant that ‘a man shall not say he knows or believes 
that which he has no scientific grounds for professing to know or believe’.154 Given that such 
knowledge of the supernatural is never possible, the scientific mind was, by necessity, agnostic. But 
for Darwin, a scientific mind was not merely agnostic in the sense of being neutral: a scientific 
mind was an actively sceptical mind. 
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This was a point Darwin made clear in two additions to the text of the ‘Recollections’ in 1879, three 
years after he had first drafted it. In the original version of his mini-essay at the end of the 
‘Recollections’ summarising the key features of his mind, Darwin had declared himself ‘not very 
sceptical – a frame of mind which I believe to be injurious to the progress of science’.155 His 
meaning here is not immediately obvious – he might mean either that scepticism is injurious to 
science or that a lack of scepticism is injurious to science – but any confusion was eliminated three 
years later by his insertion of an 850-word addendum giving three examples, drawn from his own 
experience, of how ‘a good deal of scepticism in a scientific man is advisable to avoid much loss of 
time’.156 The second of his two additions came at the end of the ‘Religious Belief’ section, where 
Darwin added a paragraph, which begins approvingly: ‘Nothing is more remarkable than the spread 
of scepticism or rationalism during the latter half of my life’.157 The prompt, both for this comment 
and his clarification of the value of scepticism to scientific progress, would appear to be the rapidly 
changing intellectual context of the late 1870s. In particular, a furore had followed the publication 
of W. K. Clifford’s ‘The Ethics of Belief’ in 1877, which had argued that belief had no place in 
science and that it was ‘wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon 
insufficient evidence’.158 
Scepticism in Darwin’s formulation of the scientific mind had two overlapping meanings. On one 
level, it was a non-religious position: a sceptic was one who doubted established religious belief – 
hence Darwin’s elision of ‘scepticism’ and ‘rationalism’ in his addition to the ‘Religious Belief’ 
section of the ‘Recollections’. On another level, it referred to a psychological tendency to question 
all ideas, even one’s own. This was the type of scepticism Darwin had in mind when he reflected 
upon his own scientific work, and noted that ‘with the exception of the Coral Reefs, I cannot 
remember a single first-formed hypothesis which had not after a time to be given up or greatly 
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modified’.159 What we might call religious scepticism and methodological scepticism both drew 
upon what Clifford called the ‘bounden duty of mankind’ to question ‘all that we believe’ and never 
to accept any statement ‘which is contrary to, or outside of, the uniformity of nature’.160 Scepticism, 
that is, was good scientific method. Modern usage of the term, particularly in relation to the science 
of climate change, can make scepticism appear an anti-scientific attribute, but for Darwin it was the 
default position of a scientific mind. 
This did not mean universal doubt. Even Clifford warned against the ‘universal sceptics’. Darwin’s 
meaning is better captured by what Feist called ‘open scepticism’: a predisposition to question 
authority, but not taken so far as to doubt all knowledge, and in which scepticism is the default 
because of the susceptibility of the brain, as an evolved organ, to mislead itself.161 As with the other 
characteristics of the scientific mind, scepticism was an innate inherited trait capable of being 
enhanced by exercise and training: it had taken an act of will for Darwin to keep his ‘mind free, so 
as to give up any hypothesis, however much beloved’, but this was possible because: ‘As far as I 
can judge, I am not apt to follow blindly the lead of other men’.162 Early in their marriage, his wife 
Emma had asked Darwin to apply a different standard to religious questions to those he used for 
science.163 We do not have Darwin’s reply, but it seems doubtful that he could have agreed to do 
this, even if he had wanted to.  For Darwin, the mark of a scientific mind was the demand for proof 
and evidence to precede belief, and the absence of such evidence ensured his rejection of 
religion.164 
Masculinity and aesthetic taste
In his 1879 addition to the ‘Religious Belief’ section, Darwin commented that his father regarded 
‘scepticism or rationalism’ as an almost exclusively male attribute, but that he had himself known 
‘several married ladies, who believe very little more than, their husbands’.165  This is noteworthy as 
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the only occasion in the ‘Recollections’ where Darwin gives any hint at all that a key attribute of a 
scientific mind might be found in females as well as males. In almost every other respect the 
‘Recollections’ was a heavily gendered text. Women were almost entirely absent from its pages, and 
the few mentions they receive emphasise a conventional feminine identity, and say little or nothing 
directly about the mind. Thus Darwin’s mother – who died when he was eight years old – is 
dispensed with in two sentences that include reference to her ‘black velvet gown, and her curiously 
constructed work-table’, while his sisters, who played an important role in his upbringing, are 
described as ‘kind and affectionate’ and credited with teaching him ‘humanity’.166 Darwin’s wife 
Emma is also largely absent – even from the short chapter that covers the period of their courtship – 
and is only ever referred to in her in roles as ‘a good Mother’ and her husband’s ‘greatest blessing’. 
She is lauded for her kindness, patience, and sympathy, and declared Darwin’s ‘superior in every 
single moral quality’, as well as his ‘wise adviser and cheerful comforter throughout life’.167 In part, 
of course, the ‘Recollections’ simply reflected the gendered conventions of Victorian autobiography 
in which women were routinely presented in the guise of an ‘Angel in the House’, but this 
presentation also tells us something about Darwin’s understanding of the scientific mind: Emma’s 
almost total absence from the ‘Recollections’ is perfectly consistent with Darwin’s proclaimed 
objective of charting his ‘mental development’ because, as he saw it, Emma was not part of that 
development.168
Darwin reasoned out his gendered construction of the scientific mind in a very particular way. 
Whereas contemporaries such as Spencer and Maudsley attributed the mental differences they 
identified between male and female minds to ‘a physiological necessity’, rooted in the intellect 
restricting capacity of the female body as a ‘closed energy system’, Darwin eschewed an argument 
that may have sounded a little too Lamarckian, in favour of a distinction rooted in a more hard-
wired inheritance and the legacy of sexual and natural selection.169 The notorious section of the 
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Descent, ‘Difference in the Mental Powers of the two Sexes’, in which Darwin discussed the 
differing mental characteristics of men and women, and included science as one of the subjects in 
which lists of the ‘most eminent men and women … would not bear comparison’, made clear that 
the divergence was fundamentally a consequence of heredity. According to Darwin, the ‘higher 
powers’ of males, which ensured preeminence in science and other subjects, were honed through 
selection (natural and sexual), and confirmed by gender differentials in inheritance.170 In the 
Variation, he had allowed that this could be more complex than a direct father to son, or mother to 
daughter inheritance, discussing deferred inheritance across generations, in which peculiarities 
could sit ‘latent in the opposite sex’ and skip a generation, allowing a father to ‘transmit through his 
daughter any character to his grandson; and the mother conversely to her granddaughter’. It was 
possible, that is, for a son to bear a greater resemblance to ‘his maternal than his paternal grandsire 
in some male attribute’, which ‘the mother cannot possess or exhibit’. 171 Thus the role of the 
female in transmitting the scientific mind was to incubate genius across a generation, and in his Life 
of Erasmus, Darwin noted that it was precisely by this matrilineal descent that Galton had inherited 
his own scientific mind from their shared grandfather.172
This was an insight Galton was more than ready to accept. In reviewing the questionnaires 
submitted for English Men of Science, Galton noted ‘the relatively small encouragement received 
from the mother in developing an interest in science and was unable to identify any respondent who 
‘speaks of having inherited a love of science from his mother, though, of course, she may, and 
probably has, often transmitted it from a grand-parent’.173 Where Darwin and Galton parted 
company in their equally gendered readings of the scientific mind, was not on the question of 
patrilineal inheritance, but in their differing assessments of what constituted the masculinity of the 
scientific mind.  For Galton, a scientific mind was a hyper-masculine mind: men of science were 
‘especially manly’; their character ‘strongly anti-feminine’; and they had ‘little sympathy with 
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female ways of thought’. The ‘special excellencies’ of the female mind, including ‘enthusiasm and 
love’, were contrasted unfavourably with the ‘colder attractions of science’, which demanded ‘calm 
judgment’, and Galton was unapologetic, celebratory even, of the fact that the ‘man of science is 
deficient in the purely emotional element’.174 In ‘a few cases’, among his questionnaire 
respondents, Galton noted that the scientific ‘hunger for truth’ was so ardent that it created ‘a 
repugnance to works of avowed fiction’; this was, however, nothing to lament.175 Darwin’s view 
was different. For Darwin, the ‘higher powers’ – honed in the evolutionary process – that 
distinguished the male were of ‘imagination and reason’.176 It was not, it should be stressed, that 
Darwin thought there was anything to be gained from a feminine mind; it was rather that his 
understanding of the masculine mind was more nuanced. Unlike Galton, Darwin retained the 
Romantic concern of earlier nineteenth-century authors who feared the contrast of an emotionally 
impoverished man of science with the more rounded and fulfilled poet or artist.177 
Rather than celebrating the limited interests and emotional deficiency of the scientific mind, Darwin 
regretted the ‘curious and lamentable’ loss of the ‘higher aesthetic tastes’, which had reduced him to 
‘a kind of machine’ for grinding out scientific laws.178 For all of Darwin’s undoubted partisanship, 
he did not regard the scientific mind as the sole and exclusive form of genius. Thus, when in the 
Descent he sought to illustrate the distance ‘between the highest men of the highest races and 
lowest savages’, he chose ‘a Newton or Shakespeare’ to illustrate the gap.179 His regret was that in 
his own life he had failed to retain his enthusiasm for the latter. The ‘intense delight’ he had once 
taken in Shakespeare as a schoolboy had been replaced by a feeling that the bard was ‘so intolerably 
dull that it nauseated me’, and his ‘exquisite delight’ in music had vanished. Whereas once he had 
traversed the Pampas with a copy of Paradise Lost stuffed in his saddle bag, in middle-age he had 
become someone unable to ‘endure to read a line of poetry’. His enjoyment of fiction was 
undiminished, but it was lowbrow novels, featuring ‘a pretty woman’ and a happy ending, read 
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aloud to him by his wife or one of his daughters, from which he took pleasure.180 Darwin did not 
doubt that this cultural impoverishment and emotional sterility was a byproduct of his scientific 
work. But, far from regarding it as a necessary or desirable attribute of the scientific mind, Darwin 
maintained that a weekly regime of poetry reading and musical appreciation would have prevented 
his loss. It was an ‘atrophy’ contingent on his own weakness and the poor habits his pursuit of 
science had encouraged, rather than an inherent defect of a particular type of mind that led men of 
science to neglect literature. Indeed, not only could this be avoided, but it should be, because the 
loss of the higher tastes was ‘injurious to the intellect, and more probably to the moral character, by 
enfeebling the emotional part of our nature’.181
This reference to ‘the emotional part of our nature’ is a reminder of Darwin’s enduring attachment 
to the Humboldtian strains of his youth that were being squeezed out of the self-fashioning of ‘men 
of science’, according to Ellis, by Galton’s hyper-masculinity and the Carlylean heroism of 
Darwin’s allies in the X-Club.182 As with his equally Janus-faced position between Whewell and 
Galton on the questions of method and morality versus biological inheritance, Darwin found 
himself straddling the terrain between an older metascientific tradition, rooted largely in natural 
theology, which he rejected, and a newer amoral, biological, and hereditary understanding, with 
which he was not entirely comfortable. Darwin’s understanding of the scientific mind, that is, drew 
from older traditions, even as it anticipated the much harder hereditarian interpretations of Galton 
and future eugenicists. Ultimately, the success of the hereditarians in developing evolutionary 
theory left Darwin’s own view of the scientific mind looking rather dated.
Conclusion
The conclusions to be drawn from the case study of any one individual are inevitably limited, even 
if that individual is Charles Darwin. But as well as casting new light upon some familiar ground in 
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the study of Darwin, the aim of this article has been to make a broader point: the study of the 
scientific mind is a topic far too important to be left to non-historians. Darwin’s view of the 
scientific mind, as outlined in his ‘Recollections’ and his Life of Erasmus Darwin, paralleled and 
complemented the progressionist anthropology of the Descent. His scientific mind, that is, was a 
white, western, male mind from which women and non-Europeans were excluded by the actions of 
natural and sexual selection across evolutionary history. Subsequent constructions, however much 
they differ from Darwin in detail, are always similarly culturally conditioned. In particular, almost a 
century and a half after the ‘Recollections’ it is still commonly assumed that a scientific mind is a 
male mind. Historians have a responsibility to help to break down such exclusionary prejudices by 
exploring their historical roots.  Far from being an essential, ahistorical, psychological entity, the 
‘scientific mind’ is always an agglomeration of historically specific prejudices and presumptions. 
My study of Darwin illustrates this and points to the need for a similarly historical approach to the 
question of the scientific mind today.  
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